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Abstract
While technology education is commonly thought of as a practical field, ethics is not commonly
thought of as such.  This paper draws upon Singer’s (1993) contention that ‘Ethics is practical,
or it is not really ethical’.
It will be argued that there is, potentially, a central ethical dimension to technology education
which becomes explicit when examining wants-needs issues; race and gender; humanism
and ontology; and, product design.  Context is provided from the broad literature which
documents the breadth of societal and global concerns relating to technology, culture, and
economics.
One focus of the paper is on design and technology curriculum as a part of a general education
within a democracy.  Thus the impact of the ethical dimension of technology curriculum design,
pedagogy and assessment on concepts such as technological literacy and the resolution of
competing stakeholder claims is addressed.
As well as showing that ethics can be both philosophical and practical in its manifestation as
a part of technology education curriculum, it is an aim of the paper to demonstrate the
professional significance of ethics-in-practice within this highly contested curriculum field.
Inasmuch as the compulsory years of
schooling are concerned with the education
of all students in their preparation for life as
citizens in a democracy, it is towards general
education rather than specialist education
that this paper leans.  This is not to say that
the post-compulsory years, and the pathways
available therein, are not considered - indeed
they are highly significant.  It should also be
noted that the constraints on the paper’s
length prevent elaboration of many points.  I
will gladly provide fuller argument on request.
Ethics
Interests in ethics have fuelled philosophical
discourse for millennia and although ‘ethics’
may have dropped somewhat from public
discourse during the 1970’s and 80’s, it has
regained some of its currency of late.  This is
hardly surprising given the technological,
economic and environmental developments
which have occurred over those decades.  A
currently acknowledged phenomenon is that
technological innovations happen faster than
it is possible for the necessary associated
ethical discourse to develop.
Any study of ethics inevitably embraces
associated terms such as morality, goodness,
right and wrong, obligation, ideals and values
and each warrants analysis of its meaning and
its role in ethical discourse.  While this paper
cannot entertain more than the briefest of
looks at this philosophical area, some
acknowledgement of the field is necessary.
Slote, 1995:591-595 contends that perhaps the
‘...major problem...of moral philosophy...is
coming up with a rationally defensible theory
of right and wrong action’, and he identifies
four current dominant basic views or theories:
Utilitarianism; Kantianism; Intuitionism; and,
Virtue ethics.  Humanist, existentialist and
post-modern theory all contribute to the
debate, and alternative perspectives to the
philosophical emerge through religious, race,
gender and class agendas.  Inasmuch as anyone
may be interested in the quality of our
existence and, indeed, of our co-existence,
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then we are faced with ethical questions and,
thus, some degree of engagement with ethical
discourse.
To the assertion that philosophers may be out
of touch with the ‘real world’ comes a
significant refutation from Singer, 1993, who
is clearly concerned about quality of life (QOL)
issues which abound.  He argues that by living
in an ethically reflective way it is possible to
overcome the individually and collectively self-
defeating goals of self-interest.  He contends
that:
Ethics is practical, or it is not really ethical.
If it is no good in practice, it is no good in
theory either.  Getting rid of the idea that
an ethical life must consist of absolute
obedience to some short and simple set
of moral rules makes it easier to avoid the
trap of an unworkable ethic.  An
understanding of ethics that allows us to
take into account the special
circumstances in which we find ourselves
is already a major step towards attaining
an ethics that we really can use to guide
our lives. (Singer, 1993:204)
This ‘practical’ view is well supported by
Warnock (1978) and Parfit (1984, also cited in
Singer).  Thus philosophers themselves show
confidence in the capacity of ethics to play a
central role in human enterprise in the coming
years - through a blend of reflection and
action.
Ethics, values and practice
The values which we hold influence our
judgements and actions.  In making value
judgements, whether personally or
professionally, we may make claims to the
worth of some action or phenomenon.  As an
example of the discourse surrounding terms
associated with ethics, it is illustrative to draw
on at least one discussion from the ethics
literature.  The example is drawn from
Frankena’s account of the uses of ‘good’
(1973:82) in which he distinguishes between
moral values, that is, things which he
contends are good on moral grounds, and
nonmoral values .  He distinguishes amongst
six sub-categories of the use of ‘good’ on
nonmoral grounds.  Five of these are highly
applicable to technology education practice:
utility values; extrinsic values; inherent values;
intrinsic values; and, contributory values.
While these sub-categories do not,
themselves, fall into the discussion of ethics
per se (being nonmoral values), my argument
is that when the question of technology
curriculum design is faced, then the design-
decision making - that marvellous weighing
up of competing variables - about what should
be taught, and how, does require ethical
reflection and action.  It remains incontestable
that there is still room for debate about what
is meant by ‘good design and technology
education’.  These are matters both
philosophical and political with which we, as
a professional group, are faced.
Indeed, ‘ethics’, ‘design’ and ‘technology’ all
have in common that they are:  contestable;
non-neutral; values-rich; and, are capable of
practical action-upon-reflection.
In examining the interweaving of ethics-
design-technology, it is worth acknowledging
something of the global and societal context
from which much ethical concern arises.  The
extent of the available literature is huge and it
derives from many fields.  Its clarity and
richness cannot be ignored when considering
the education and QOL of future generations.
Global and societal concerns: our inter-
connectedness
Several famous names come to mind when
one seeks to portray global concerns.  These
people have in common a capacity to have
critiqued our own mass understandings (those
we collectively hold from within our ‘Western’
perspective) of the cultural, economic,
technological and political world beyond.
Schumacher, (1973); Papanek, (1974); Toffler,
(1971); Singer, (1993); and Suzuki, (1997) have
all offered articulate perspectives bringing
global concerns to the attention of increasing
numbers of people and alerting audiences to
their cultural, economic, technological and
political inter-connectedness and inter-
dependence.
Schumacher, (1973), Noble (1977) and
Henderson, (1980) all demonstrate the
symbiosis of capitalism, dehumanising
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technology and technological determinism.
These authors, who all challenge Western
economic-technological systems on ethical
grounds, openly declare their values hand.
(Less so those whose hand Roy (1977) urges
we critique to expose implicit agendas.)
In discussing globalization, Redclift and
Benton (1994), who develop their challenge
to technological determinism and call for
careful examination of consequences of
economic systems which remain solely
quantitative, look for qualitative aspects in the
global environment.  They state:
The term ‘globalization’ implies
interconnectedness, but it is clear that
images and representations flow in
different directions.  There are different
dimensions of global cultural relations,
with specific, and interconnected,
implications for the environment.  Of the
four dimensions which come to mind - the
spatial, technological, material and
representational - each can be considered
as a component of globalization. (Redclift
and Benton, 1994:14)
Here, technology has been alluded to as a
dimension of cultural relations and the
technological impact on social relations,
indeed, technological imperialism, is also
documented by Siraj-Blatchford and Patel
(1994).  The transportability of technology
through the economic, the political, the social
and the cultural may seem obvious enough.
However, Jonas (1991) argues further:
Thus, form and matter of technology alike
enter into the dimension of ethics.  The
questions raised for ethics by the objects
of technology are defined by the major
areas of their impact and thus fall into such
fields of knowledge as ecology,
...demography, economics, biomedical and
behavioural sciences (even the psychology
of mind pollution by television), and so
forth. (Jonas, 1991:115)
Who needs(?), wants(?)
When Redclift & Benton (1994:3) say:  ‘...the
preoccupation of economics with wealth-
creation, efficiency in production, and the
satisfaction of human wants suggests the
inescapability of a confrontation with the
material conditions and setting of economic
activity’ (my emphasis), they were careful not
to say needs.  The ethics embedded in QOL
issues stemming from technology and its
products are commonly discussed.  As
Montgomery (1974:17) comments on
Tocqueville’s view that ‘...the American
concern with technology meant the equation
of “good” with “goods”...’, so Turnbull
(1988:280), a merchant banker, argues
ethically when he draws together technology,
(Australian) society and QOL and comments
that ‘...there is a limit to the amount of goods
and services individuals can or want to
consume.’
Beyond the product
An essential characteristic of technological
enterprise is that of ‘purpose’, that is, the
design or intention which is behind the
technological act (Black & Harrison, 1994;
Cardwell, 1994; Mitcham, 1994; Gardner,
1995).  It is technology as ‘action’ which adds
an ethical dimension to the field.  It is no
longer acceptable to operate within the solely
manufacturing phase of activity.  Today, one
might explore the ethical issues on a
technology continuum of intention-design-
manifestation-application with, importantly,
consequence being assessed at each stage.
This view is not shared by those who consider
technology to be ‘neutral’ and who argue that
it is the users of technology to whom the ethics
should apply.  Holders of this view separate
the product from the act of using it.  Thus we
can question not only the incarnation of the
design of any product or system but also the
associated issue of the intentions of the
designer - and, in turn, our roles as consumers
or purchasers of these products and systems
(Whiteley, 1993; Keirl, 1997a).  The incarnation
of products with ‘designed obsolescence’
(Papanek, 1974:235-7) and for ‘consumption’
by the ‘throw-away society’ (Toffler, 1971) is
only part of the picture, as the ‘after use’ and
‘function creep’ (Nixon, 1996:36) aspects of
designed products are now a concern for
society too.  The ethical aspects of designing
are articulated by Mayall (1979) and Whiteley
(1993) who both identify the need for
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designers’ values to match clients’ values in
the design-manifestation process.  This may
be a straighforward affair with an individual
client but matters are somewhat different
where the mass market is concerned.
Three ‘democratic-technology’ issues
1 The prevalence of positivist and technicist
approaches to technology are a major
concern for women.  Grant, (1983);
Cockburn, (1991); Apple, (1992); Wajcman,
(1993), (1994); Whiteley, (1993); and,
Weiner (1994) have written about the
alienation and disenfranchisement of
women by, through, and from, technology.
Gendered technology is not merely an
issue of epistemology, it is a human rights
issue, a matter for any democratic society
to address.
2 From authors who critique technological
literacy discourses we can also see the
linking of ethics, politics and technology.
Luke (1992), elaborates on ‘cultural’ and
‘functional’ literacy (for an elite and for the
mass, respectively), while Beynon (1992)
and Apple (1992), are unequivocal in
making the political and ethical
transparent.
3 Regardless of the colloquial support for
technological determinism, the major
question is one of free will and whether
we actually do have the power, individually
or collectively, to determine what
technology influences and does.  The
whole  question of ‘choice’ and whether
we actually have such a freedom, in the
democratic  sense, is interwoven with this
issue.  Political solutions remain
problematic, as any government which
intervened to slow or stop the spread of a
technology which people wanted (q.v.
needed) would be deemed by those people
to be authoritarian (Cardwell, 1994).  As
Beynon and Mackay (1992) say:
Technological determinism diverts
attention from such questions as the
relationship of technology to human
need.  Implicit in technological
determinism is that there is no choice
about the technology we have.  (Beynon
and Mackay, 1992:12)
Self and technology
As a QOL issue, it is appropriate to mention
the ontological dimension of technological
practice.  The issue of the humanity and
dignity of technological process has been
around for some time (William Morris in
Morton, 1979).  More recently Graves (1986),
Apple (1992) and Roszak (1996) provide
cautions about the deskilling and
depersonalising role of computers in the
context of current economic policies.
Meanwhile Fry (1992) offers an excellent
perspective of our very separation from
technological process.  This ontological
dimension is so often absent from the agendas
of those who would determine our field.
It would be possible to summarise matters
thus far on a clear note of doom and
pessimism.  However this is not an option I
wish to entertain as it would be neither
professionally defensible nor very helpful.
These matters of QOL for all people cannot
be tackled without wisdom and commitment
and there can be no doubt that educators have
a key role to play.  Singer, in weaving the
societal and the individual good, critiques
‘narrow self-interest’ and argues the case for
‘enlightened self-interest’.  He considers the
seeming meaninglessness of life - whether
perceived by existentialists or by disillusioned
adolescents - and suggests:
Here ethics offer a solution.  An ethical life
is one in which we identify ourselves  with
other, larger, goals, thereby giving meaning
to our lives...Cynicism is more fashionable
than idealism.  But such hopes are not
groundless, and there are substantial
elements of truth in the ancient view that
an ethically reflective life is also a good life
for the person leading it.  Never has it been
so urgent that the reasons for accepting
this view should be widely understood.
(Singer, 1997:30)
Ethics and technology education within a
general education for democracy
Three significant contextual factors occur.  The
first concerns the centrality of education to
democracy itself.  In her cogent exploration
of Education, Democracy and the Public
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Interest, White (1973) comes, inter alia, to two
conclusions.  She comments that:
There is at least one policy which must be
in the public interest in a democracy.  This
(policy) is an appropriate education for a
democracy.  (White, 1973:237)
Thus education is the keystone for the well-
being of the democracy and for the well-being
of its participants.  However, White also argues
that the determination of what might
constitute that ‘appropriate education’ cannot
be left to ‘experts’ ‘...to be worked out much
as the value of the gross national product is
calculated’ (White 1973:223-224).  As public
interest policies are about things which the
public ought to have, White argues that they
are, therefore, value judgements.  Thus moral
judgements are central to the determination
of the core policy (i.e. education) of a
democracy.
The second contextual factor concerns the
advent of globalisation, wherein it is possible
to witness communications, media and
commercial influences which have the
capacity to bypass political systems and
national and cultural integrity.  In this context
the recent OECD technology, mathematics
and science education initiative (Black & Atkin,
1997) implicitly links narrow economic
interests with curriculum determination.
The third contextual factor concerns the
competing interests of stakeholder groups.
Given that the field of technology is so
extensive, and so central to culture, politics
and society, it is hardly surprising that there
are multiple interests in its delivery in schools.
A whole range of agendas and tensions
becomes clear when one examines the
literature.  A useful framework is offered by
Layton (1994:13-17) who identified: economic
instrumentalists; professional technologists;
sustainable developers; girls and women;
defenders of participatory democracy; and,
liberal educators.
In the context of these three factors alone,
determining technology curriculum is, indeed,
an ethical business.  Using Frankena’s analysis
it is possible to determine a technology
curriculum on the grounds of the nonmoral
values and claim it to be a ‘good’ curriculum.
However, I suspect this would imply a rather
limited view of curriculum.  If one turns to
the stakeholders, while each group can argue
that theirs is the worthy claim, any claim to
worthiness must ultimately draw upon
judgements of value and upon moral
argument.  As some of these claimants have
the potential to be exclusive of others, there
is the question of whether all six can be
addressed within the general education years.
It would seem that White’s argument for moral
adjudication is sound.  Thus we are left with
the issue of who the quantitative ‘experts’ (q.v.
White) might be, and who might constitute
the alternative to them.  This, I contend, is a
task for a technology education profession of
international calibre with an ethically based
global vision.
Brief notes on pedagogy and assessment
1 It could be argued that the values-morals-
ethics part of technology education is not
the core business of present-day
technology educators.  Olson (1997) rightly
rebuts this notion and cites Barnett:
‘...an arrangement by which
responsibility for practical capability
rested with technology, and for critical
awareness with (other) subjects...where
values had been driven into exile
from...technology, would be
undesirable.  This would tend to
confirm technology as a ghetto for
ingenious, specialist tinkerers, and the
Humanities as the natural home for anti-
technologists.’  (in Olson, 1997:388)
The Design Council, arguing the centrality
of design-related activity to general
education, cautions that:
...the questioning of existing ideas
which form part of many design
projects, can sometimes lead to
challenging and uncomfortable
questions being asked about social and
economic values...  (Design Council,
1992:9)
2 Implicit in the last quotation and, indeed,
in all the curriculum considerations, are
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significant pedagogical and assessment
implications.  The profession may need to
be mindful that default teaching styles,
knowledge constructions and assessment
procedures can quickly become tails which
wag the curriculum dog.  While the
pedagogy of deeply values-centred
education can be challenging for teachers,
this need not mean that such a pedagogy
cannot be adopted.  The teaching of
controversial  issues has been a part of the
repertoire of many teachers for some time
(see e.g. Stradling et al., 1984).
3  The assessment issues for design and
technology education are complex and
need well-prepared professionals (Kimbell,
1997).  Non-professional interference (in
assessment) based either on ignorance or
upon agendas of thinly disguised political
control is common.  This is the preferred
political route for ‘measuring’ ‘quality’ and
productivity and is not new (Apple &
Teitelbaum, 1986).  The rhetoric is of
standards and helping students.  The reality
is of control - of teachers and schools - and
of students as ‘products’.
Conclusion
Issues, values, ethics and morality and
technology are the stuff of every day,
everywhere.  The practise of ethics and the
ethics of practice in technology education
constitute a complex issue, central to the
concerns of educators and society alike.
Authors (Owen and Abbott-Chapman) concur
on the centrality of ethics to our field.  In order
to be ethical Singer suggests we blend
reflection and action.
‘Critical’ approaches to technology education
are called for (see e.g. Habermas, 1971; Keirl,
1997b).  Only through an elaborated critically
reflective professional culture will it be
possible to articulate an ethical technology
education which must:
• embrace a global, seventh generation,
vision (Shenandoah in Schaef, 1995).
• be defensible in its global consequences.
• fulfil the requirements of democracy and
democratic education.
• serve the future citizen as a member of a
democracy and as a fulfilled individual
• manifest curriculum, pedagogy and
assessment strategies which promote the
above.
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